This is necessarily part of the dialectic of enlightenment. Whereby this disciplining in science as also claimed by the Enlightenment, is occasionally rooted merely in pragmatic reasons; this is very drastically explained in Kant’s “Dispute between the Faculties”. Here he quite precisely separates, for example, theology, the natural sciences and others from philosophy – but only in order to secure “his” philosophy the right to autarky, independence and freedom. In other words, to explain to the Prussian state that all other disciplines in the sciences are practical and must therefore legitimize themselves, but not philosophy – a rhetorical-political trick.
But Kant goes even further, separating for example pure reason from practical reason and both from (the critique of) judgment. And Hegel follows this in even more detail.
This is astounding, since discipline has a deeply military dimension: clear rules, unambiguous language and categories, decisive behavior, and thus results without doubt. But this inner tension of the Enlightenment, precisely the dialectic inherent in it, continues to break through to this day, since the so-called sciences are very fond of talking about disciplines and are still praised at universities and in faculties (the latter literally so joyfully formulates possibilities). Only gradually are the ideas of interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary reflections and actions beginning to take hold. Thus, a possible new substance of Enlightenment.